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WHITE COLLAR CRIME AND TACTICS
OF THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
The players all folded. One said, "Nothing! Hand full of nothing. You
won all that with nothing?" Luke grinned and replied, "Yeah . . . well
sometimes nothing can be a real cool hand." Occasionally, the actions of
government prosecutors resemble Paul Newman in Cool Hand Luke.
Therefore, it is imperative for white collar defense lawyers, who wish to
have a full arsenal of tactics, to possess the ability to recognize a bluff.
Kenneth Mann, in his study of white collar criminal defense techniques,
suggests that:
[t]he criminal justice system is improperly characterized by the plea
bargaining literature, to the extent that the literature claims to
provide a whole picture. In part of the system plea bargaining
dominates, and administrative efficiency and organizational
equilibrium are preferred values. But there is another part, one
which is not as open to public view, characterized by a carefully
planned clash of positions and contest of sophisticated tactics and
strategies; there, adversariness is the preferred value.'
This Comment is designed to facilitate the understanding of the white
collar criminal plea bargaining process "which is not as open to the public
view" and illuminate the actors' "carefully planned clash of positions." There
is more to this process than a plea of guilty to reduced charges. The order
of ideas in this Comment should be considered as both chronological and
at times interactive depending on the facts and law of each case.
1. K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 231 (1985).
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II. WHITE COLLAR CRIME IS DISTINCT FROM STREET CRIME
It is important to understand the distinction between street crime and
white collar crime in the context of this Comment as the process with which
a defense lawyer negotiates with the government is so disparate. Street
crime is defined by Kenneth Mann in his work Defending White Collar
Crime, as "all crimes involving threat and use of physical violence against
persons, drug violations, theft involving use of physical force, and other
related crimes."2 Sociologist Edwin Sutherland first coined the phrase "white
collar crime" in 1940 while studying corporate illegalities.' He defines it as
a crime committed by persons of "respectability and high social status."4
The Justice Department today defines white collar crime with the focus on
the act not the actor. White collar crime includes "nonviolent crime for
financial gain committed by means of deception by persons . . . having
professional status or specialized technical skills."' Lowell Jensen, then
Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, in 1986 defines white
collar crime as:
[s]uch offenses as bribery and corruption of officials at all levels of
government; procurement fraud; tax fraud and fraud against
government programs; bank fraud and embezzlement; consumer
fraud and antitrust violations; securities, commodities, and other
investment fraud; misuse of union funds and labor bribery; and
environmental crimes and food and drug law violations.6
Society views white collar crime as seriously as many conventional
property and violent crimes according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics
report of March 1988.7 In 1986, Lowell Jensen testified before the U.S.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 19.
4. M. PiCKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, GUIDE To WHrrE COLLAR CRIME 3 (1986).
5. U.S. Dep't Of Justice, NCJ-106876, Bureau Of Justice Statistics, Special Report White
Collar Crime 1 (Sept. 1987), [hereinafter, DOJ Special Report], citing, U.S. Dep't Of Justice,
NCJ-76939, Bureau Of Justice Statistics, Dictionary Of Criminal Justice Data Terminology, at
215 (2d ed. 1981).
6. Oversight Of The Problem Of White Collar Crime: Part I Hearings Before The Senate
Committee On The Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 26, 27 (1986). [hereinafter Hearings Part 1].
7. U.S. Dep't Of Justice, Bureau Of Justice Statistics, Report To The Nation On Crime
And Justice 16 (2d ed. March 1988). The National Survey of Crime Severity was conducted in
1977. Severity scores were developed from responses to the survey and mathematical techniques
were used to formulate comparisons. The report found that the score (of severity) "for a doctor
cheating on claims he or she makes to a Federal health insurance plan for patient services is
almost three times as high as the score for forcefully robbing a victim of $10 when no injury
[Vol. 1989
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Senate Judiciary Committee that "[i]n 1974 the National Chamber of
Commerce estimated the annual loss through white collar crime at $40
billion."' Jensen, in his testimony, stated a study funded by the accounting
firm of Peat, Marwick and Mitchell in 1982 suggests that the loss has
ballooned to $200 billion.' Mr. Jensen also added that "fraud or other
criminal conduct in fact was a factor in about half of the bank failures that
occurred [from 1981-1986]. " 10
The difference between street crime and white collar crime is also
manifest in the plea bargaining process. Defense attorneys handling street
crimes, argues Kenneth Mann, are usually "restricted to helping their clients
arrange a plea of guilty, and they bargain over facts already known to the
government."" He asserts that when handling street crimes "[t]he defense
function is weakened and distorted because [defense] attorneys do not have
the opportunity to do more than negotiate a compromise." 2 The white
collar defense counsel does not assume that the government has the facts
which would support a conviction.1 3 Unlike the street crime attorney, the
white collar defense attorney starts with the assumption that although his
client may be guilty "he may be able to keep the government from knowing
this. . . ." Mann's thesis is that a white collar defense counsel may
ultimately have to advise his client to plead guilty "but the compromise
that leads to a plea agreement is the result of a carefully managed process
of adversary interaction. . . ."" The assertion is that the white collar
defense attorney might have some influence in the contours of the ultimate
plea agreement.
III. HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
According to Professor Albert Alschuler in his article "Plea Bargaining
And Its History," the judicial practice of dissuading guilty pleas continued
into the late second half of the nineteenth century.' 6 It was at this time
occurs."









16. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining And Its History, 79 COLUM. L REv. 1, 5 (1979).
1989]
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that prosecutorial plea bargaining surfaced. t7 In 1892, the U.S. Supreme
Court for the first time in Hallinger v. Davis8 upheld a guilty plea convic-
tion. 9 By 1925, the percentage of total cases that resulted in guilty pleas
had reached approximately 90 percent, the same level of guilty pleas that
occur today.'
During 1985, 10,733 defendants were convicted of federal white collar
crimes."' This figure represents an 18 percent increase from 1980. 2 The
conviction rate for white collar offenders was 85 percent, [78 percent by
plea and 7 percent by trial] contrasted with a 78 percent conviction rate for
all other federal offenders.23 Of the 15 percent not convicted of a white
collar offense, only 2 percent of the defendants were acquitted in either a
judge or jury trial in 1985 and 12 percent of these cases were dismissed.24
Accordingly, white collar defense counsel should perceive the importance of
swiftly developing strategy to offset the odds of conviction.
The Justice Department also reports that white collar offenders are
more likely to be sentenced to probation than non-white collar offenders.'
Of the white collar offenders convicted in 1985, 40 percent were sentenced
to prison while 54 percent of the non-white collar offenders were sentenced
to prison.2 The report states that one reason for the lower incarceration
rates for white collar offender is their general lack of prior criminal
history.27 The average length of sentences for white collar offenders was
twenty-nine months compared to an average of fifty months for non-white
collar offenders. 28
It is notable that the United States Sentencing Commission', in its
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 10 (citing, Hallings v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892)).
19. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 10.
20. Id.






27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
29. The United States Sentencing Commission [hereinafter Commission] is an independent
agency in the judicial branch whose primary purpose is to establish sentencing guidelines,
policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994. See
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual [hereinafter Guidelines). The United
States Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 5, 1988, questioning the constitutionality
of the Commission. On January 18, 1989, the Court held eight to one that the Sentencing
[Vol. 1989
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analysis of past practices, shows that defendants who pled guilty received a
sentence "[t]hat averaged between 30 to 40 percent lower than a sentence
which would have been imposed had the defendant pled not guilty and been
subsequently convicted. "30
IV. NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE DECISION TO PLEAD GUILTY:
A CONTEST OF INFORMATION GATHERING AND CONTROL
A. Client Contacts Defense Counsel
1. The Client
It is critical to determine who the client is for the purposes of the
attorney-client relationship.31  This determination can be especially
significant in the area of white collar crime where the corporation may be
the client and not the individuals who comprise it. The boundaries of the
attorney-client relationship are set forth in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rule) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code).3 The concept is that representation is carried out by
agency: "A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents. aa The Model
Rules require that defense counsel who represent a corporation and its
officers, directors, employees, members, or shareholders may only do so if
such representation will not violate the conflict of interest rules.3  If a
corporation and an employee of the corporation seek the same defense
counsel with respect to the same transaction the potential for conflict exists.
Defense counsel under the Model Rules must make sure not represent a
client that will adversely affect the relationship with another client and each
client must consent after consultation.35
Guidelines are constitutional in an opinion delivered by Justice Blackmun. Mistretta v. United
States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4102 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1989).
30. Wilkens, Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibiliy, Role of the Offender, and
Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE
FORRESr L. REV. 181, 191 (1988). [hereinafter Plea Negotiations]. William W. Wilkens Jr., the
author, is Circuit Judge, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and
Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission.
31. M. PICKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 90.
32. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (West 1987); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (West 1987).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (West 1987).
34. Id.
35. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC" RULE 1.7 (West 1987).
1989]
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Defense counsel in a white collar case may be asked to represent more
than one party. For example, parallel litigation of the same matter in a
civil, administrative, or criminal context may often involve the same
attorney.' Multiple representation is not prohibited by the Model Rules or
the Model Code.37 Marvin Pickholz, in Guide To White Collar Crime, cites
several advantages to multiple representation in the setting of a grand jury
investigation.' Some of the prominent advantages are that "clients are
better able to maintain a united front; it may contribute to the termination
of the investigation; a single lawyer can act as a funnel for all information.
"39
2. Client Disclosures to His Attorney
Kenneth Mann, in Defending WHITE COLLAR CRIME, depicts a strategy
of "information control" embraced by some which includes limiting the
information a client reveals to his attorney ° Mann says some attorneys
desire to know everything that could relate to the investigation. 1 But many
lawyers have dual goals; extract certain facts and discourage the disclosure
of others that might harm a good defense.12 For instance, some lawyers do
not want to know facts that would tend to prove knowledge. 3 Mann states,
"[tlhey would not want to find out that a client actually had knowledge of
a fact that would prove criminal intent--knowledge of a report or the action
of another person--if the government was not going to find this out".' The
point is that the lack of knowledge is easier to argue to the prosecutor if
the defense attorney is not aware of his client's knowledge. In this context,
information control is also a form of self-preservation. As Mann notes,
"It]he deeper moral dilemma for the white collar crime defense attorneys is
the question of what it means to devote oneself to defending persons who
36. M. PICKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 91.
37. Id. (citing, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 (1983); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-105 (1981).
38. M. PIcKHOL.z, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 92.
39. Id. See McNeil, Banks Under Attack-Revisited, 1989 ABA. SECtON OF LMGATiON at
341, for discussion of multiple representation and possible pitfalls.
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commit white collar crimes ... Tension concerning this question ... can
be significantly reduced by controlling information .... 4s
Mann labels the techniques of information control as "avoidance."'
One technique is to not ask, "Would you please tell me everything that
happened?"47 One attorney explained the usefulness of non-disclosure as
follows:
Let me put the dilemma to you this way. We are representing a
company being investigated for [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
violations]. We have decided to cooperate fully [with the govern-
ment]. So lets say I'm briefed thoroughly by the vice-president and
others. I think there are some "questionable" activities, but they are
not so serious that there will be a criminal recommendation [for
prosecution by the investigator]. . . . But let's say I've been told
about one big payoff that looks ugly. Then I'm in trouble, I can't
enter into a free-wheeling conversation with the agent as if being
forthcoming. If your strategy is to imply that your client's actions
were de minimis, you can't very well stop in the middle of the
conversation and say, I can't answer that question...
Some attorneys control information by limiting the time frame of their
questions. If the client is being investigated for tax violations during
particular years, then some attorneys would consider that their representa-
tion of the client only includes those years.49 Still others control the client's
dialogue with a "Stop, I don't want to hear that."50 Of the attorneys Mann
studied, most admit they sometimes choose not to probe for certain facts."'
B. Defense Counsel Assesses Client Status
Defense counsel should immediately try to determine the status of the
client. The client may be a witness needed to provide only factual
information for the investigation. 52  The client could be a target to be
45. Id. at 104.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 105.
48. Id. at 106.
49. Id. at 107.
50. Id. at 108.
51. Id. at 103.
52. Connelly & Fahner, Unconventional Strategies in White Collar Criminal Investigations,
14 LmGATION 17 (1988).
19891
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indicted as result of the investigation.13  A target is someone whom the
investigation centers on for the purposes of ultimate indictment. The client
may be in an uncertain or subject status.54 If the government will not
disclose the status of the client, assume he is a target.55
Defense counsel should then determine the conduct under investiga-
tion. 6 Often this can be determined from observation of the documents
listed in the subpoena." Sometimes attorneys can ascertain information by
calling the prosecutor. 8 Next, the attorney must seek to gain a "[gleneral
understanding of the conduct and the business context in which it oc-
curred." 9 Then, once a basic factual investigation has commenced, he
should assess the potential exposure of the client. This includes analysis of
civil, criminal, and administrative issues.' The applicable statutes and
regulations should be researched to help determine the scope of representa-
61tion necessary.
The idea is that by the time negotiations begin (if they do), defense
counsel will already have a command of the facts and the law. Kenneth
Mann suggests that "[t]he strength of [defense counsel's] position at the
bargaining table vis-a-vis the government is often the result of steps [he]
takes early in an investigation. ... "62 This command is critical as "[nlothing
undermines a defense lawyer's credibility so much as the making of factual
or legal assertions that the prosecutor knows are wrong."63
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Mukasey, Dealing With The Prosecutor, in BUSINESS CRIMES 233 238-239 (J. Glekel
ed. 1982).
56. M. PICKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 15.
57. Id.
58. Id. Pickholz warns that this should only be done by counsel and not an employee of
the company. If the attorney was involved in some way in the conduct under investigation
"outside counsel should be used to avoid any inadvertent admissions." Id. Pickholz states that
the more experienced the prosecutor the more likely one will be able to gain information from
him. Id.
59. Id. at 16.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. K. MANN, supra note 1, at 14.
63. Glanzer & Taskier, The Fine Art of Plea Bargaining, 2 CRIM. JUsT. 7, 8 (1987).
[Vol. 1989
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C. Defense Counsel's First Contact With The Government:
Information Gathering
Frequently, it is the first contact with the prosecutor where the status
of the client is discovered. The defense attorney and prosecutor must speak
the same language. "Target" and "subject" must mean the same thing to all
involved. One expert relates an account where a lawyer who was told his
client was not a target "[ajllowed his client to testify without immunity
before the grand jury. The client was not only indicted for the substantive
crime at issue, but for perjury in denying it."' It appears the prosecutor
"[h]ad in mind a particular definition of 'target' as someone whom it had
definitely been determined would be indicted."6 Some defense counsel
experts believe in contacting the government before they have contacted
the client:'
If the lawyer is aware of a criminal investigation that may involve
contact with the client, the lawyer should take the initiative and ask
the prosecutor to make contact through the lawyer. Arguably, the
request may alert the prosecutor to the existence of the client.
Still, if a newspaper has announced that a law enforcement agency
[is] examining the Department of Defense contract awarded to
OverCharge, Inc., and the client is the executive responsible for cost
accounting at OverCharge, there is no reason to pretend coyly that
the client may luck out and avoid being contacted.67
Yet, Michael Mukasey, former Assistant United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, expresses the advantages of playing ignorant
at the beginning.68 "There are two advantages [says the former prosecutor]:
first, it is often true, whether you know it at the time or not; and second,
it is bound to generate some information."69 Mukasey also suggests that
defense counsel should consider bringing a colleague to any meeting with
the government." The person should be one who understands what the
defense attorney is trying to accomplish.71 The colleague can take notes, be
64. Mukasey, supra note 55, at 238.
65. Id. at 238-39.
66. Connelly, supra note 52, at 21.
67. Id.
68. Mukasey, supra note 55, at 239.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 239-40.
71. Id. at 240.
1989]
9
Askinosie: Askinosie: Cool Hand Lawyers: White Collar Crime
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
a witness (if necessary), and provide input as to the success of the defense
strategy. 2
The first discussion with the prosecutor can provide insight into the
"legal underpinnings" of the government's case.73 The objective of the
investigation may be telegraphed by the disclosure of certain information.
For example, the assignment of a special agent to the case "identifies an
external constituency to which the prosecutor will be held accountable; and
defines . . . the statutory predisposition of the investigation."74  The
significance of understanding the legal theories of the government's case will
be a recurrent theme in this Comment.
Both the prosecutor and defense attorney see the first meeting as a fact
gathering opportunity.75 The prosecutor wants to know "what happened
when, what the target will say about events, where documents are ... and
[learn the strategic approach of the defense]."76 Kenneth Mann states that
as a result of these goals of the prosecutor, the defense attorney will often
approach the meeting with the opposite goal of prevention; avoiding
disclosure of the facts that are potentially damaging."n Accordingly, Mann
states that the government has a second goal; "to conceal what it knows and
the legal positions it is considering."'
The three styles observed by Mann that defense attorneys exhibit in the
initial meetings with the government are passive listening, adversarial
argument, and assistance. 9 Thepassive listening approach assumes the agent
or prosecutor will be cooperative.8 Sometimes the government will only
reveal a general area of investigative interest.81 This can be immensely
helpful because now the defense attorney can intelligently question his
client.' At other times the government will disclose "a detailed account of
72. Id.
73. M. PICKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 17.
74. Id.
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the inculpatory information held by the government."' If this occurs, the
prosecutor is usually near the end of the investigation.
Another style is the adversarial encounter which centers on starting an
argument with the investigator in an effort to compel him to defend his
position.8 One attorney used this method by not allowing his client to take
a "blanket Fifth" in which the person states that he will not answer any
question in an interview with an investigator. ss One attorney observed that
"[w]hen the client refuses to take a blanket Fifth but takes the Fifth on
each individual question, the inexperienced investigator then reviews for the
defense attorney much of his case by asking a long series of questions. "'
A third approach is assisting the investigator, which assumes defense
counsel can convince the government they need the assistance.87  This
approach shows the agent or prosecutor that the defense attorney can
gather facts more efficiently than the government.' The defense attorney
and government are simultaneously benefitted if the defense attorney is able
to produce documents and testimony that explain the conduct under
investigation.' This will hopefully lead to a termination of the investigation
and a reallocation of government resources to the next case.
There are also indirect methods of information gathering such as
tracking the movement of criminal investigators." This method of informa-
tion gathering includes monitoring the grand jury investigation by keeping
in close contact with potential witnesses and their counsel.91 Defense
counsel at this phase (and in all aspects of an investigation) should be
83. Id. at 80-81. The details disclosed early can sometimes benefit the government. A
commercial lawyer hired a white collar expert in one of Mann's examples and described the
scene this way:
ATTY: As I said before, I was more sure of myself with this hotshot helping me
avoid pitfalls. [For example] there were five defendants. I was representing one, the
only one who wasn't willing to cooperate. I went down to the U.S. Attorney's office
with [the defense specialist, a former Assistant], and there at the meeting the
[prosecutor] showed us films--tapes of my client taking a bribe. He said to me, 'If
you want to go to trial, it's up to you.' So, we had another meeting with the client
... I told him he was lucky they showed us the tapes. Id. at 81.
84. Id. at 81.
85. Id. at 83.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 83-4.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 85.
90. Id. at 86-88.
91. M. PIcKHoLz, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 18.
1989]
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aware of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 and deal
with third party witnesses through counsel, not directly.
D. The Power of the Prosecutor:
Strengths and Weaknesses of His Position.
1. The Effect on the Client and Negotiating Process
Prosecutors regularly overcharge in both number of counts and the
severity of offenses in the indictment.93 The Department of Justice's stated
policy is to recommend the grand jury charge be "the most serious offense
consistent with a defendant's conduct."94 Department of Justice stated policy
on Additional Charges is that the government bring "as few charges as are
necessary to ensure that justice is done."95 The United States Attorney's
Manual (USAM) additionally states that "the bringing of unnecessary
charges ... constitutes an excessive -- and potentially unfair -- exercise of
power."' However, a former Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of
the Fraud Unit of the United States Attorney's Office in the District of
Columbia, Seymour Glanzer states, "[t]he policy is, of course, honored more
in the breach than in the observance."' Prosecutors, say Glanzer, frequently
"pyramid" counts in the indictment, overstate criminal conduct, and stack
counts upon one another.9 The net effect is the necessity to plea bargain
to "alleviate the unfairness." 99
92. 18 U.S.C. §1512 (Supp. IV 1986).
93. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 7.
94. Id. (citing, Charging Most Serious Offenses, UNrrED STATES ATroRNEYS MANUAL § 9-
27310 (1980)). [hereinafter USAM].
95. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 7 (citing, USAM § 9-27.320 (1980)).
96. Id.
97. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 7.
98. Id., Glanzer Notes: For example, if a defendant-government official
received or solicited cash from someone doing business with the
official's government agency, a prosecutor could charge him with
illegally obtaining a gratuity, 18 U.S.C. §201(f)-(i), which carries
a two year potential term of imprisonment and/or a fine. This
same defendant could be charged with conspiracy to defraud the
United States, 18 U.S.C. §371, with a potential five year term of
imprisonment and/or fine; or with bribery, 18 U.S.C. §201(b)-
(e), with a potential 15 year term of imprisonment and/or fine;
or with a Hobbs Act violation, 18 U.S.C. §1951, with a 20 year
term of imprisonment and/or fine. The prosecutor could, finally,
by pyramiding counts charge all of those crimes together. Id.
99. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 7.
[Vol. 1989
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2. The Government Assesses the Risks of Trial
and Probability of Conviction
The most elusive element of the government's case against a white
collar defendant is proof of intent10t Professor Stan Wheeler of Yale Law
School testified before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee On
Oversight of the Problem of White Collar Crime about a six year study at the
Yale Law School of white collar crime.' The hearings before the Judiciary
Committee were in the wake of a massive plea bargain with E.F. Hutton in
1986.'02 Professor Wheeler addressed the question of intent and stated:
[o]ur criminal law requires criminal intent; that's one of the most
difficult things to find in many of the complex frauds that character-
ize white-collar crime. That's undoubtedly one of the reasons why
in the E.F. Hutton case you find the prosecution of the corporation,
but not of the individuals."°3
Wheeler spoke of the problem of "diffusion of intent.""° He characterized
the circumstances this way:
Oftentimes, in the offenses one looks at, you have a pattern in
which A does something, C does something and D does something,
no one of them is able to show to have had the requisite criminal
intent when they did it, but the end result is an illegal transfer...
105
The lack of individual intent is the reason individuals were not indicted
in the E.F. Hutton case."5 Stephen S. Trott, then Assistant Attorney
100. Hearings Part I, supra note 6, at 104.
101. Id.
102. Id. United States v. The E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., No. 85-
0601, (M.D. Pa. May 2, 1985).
103. Hearings Part I, supra note 6, at 104.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 104, 105.
106. Oversight of the Problem of White Collar Crime, Hearings Before the Committee on the
Judiciary United States Senate, Part III, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 110-111 (1986) (testimony of
Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division and Assistant U.S. Attorney
Albert Murray). [hereinafter Hearings Part III].
Mr. Trott. All right, and we did not find that the evidence, and this is the collective
judgment of the investigative team and the investigators, we did not find that type of
1989]
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General, Criminal Division, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
regarding the "Assessment of Risks of Trial" in E.F. Hutton.1 7 Mr. Trott
stated that the case basically (although very complicated) was about check
abuses by the company." He conveyed the Department's concern with the
scope of trial:
[7],000,000 documents subpoenaed by the grand jury, our estimate
is that several hundred thousand would have been needed at trial.
The number of authenticating witnesses alone would have exceeded
200.... over 100 fact witnesses and a number of experts [would
have been presented]. Pretrial discovery in this case would have
taken months .... 109
E.F. Hutton finally came to the bargaining table because if they did not,
they would be charged with a felony and feared loss of their license from
the Securities & Exchange Commission. 110
evidence against Mr. Ball [then CEO of E.F. Hutton], Mr. Foman, [then Chairman]
... And so, therefore we did not prosecute them. We will never prosecute anybody
if in the judgment of the prosecutors and in the Department of Justice is that the
evidence does not establish guilt, and we did not have the quantity of evidence against
people at higher levels...
Mr. Metzenbaum. Of course it emanated from there.
Mr. Trott. But we cannot indict on the basis of must have, could not have happened
unless, or anything else. We have to have hard evidence. Id. at 110.
107. Id. at 31.
108. Id.
109. Id. Mr. Trott expressed a "number of serious practical problems" such as; (1) The
prospective individuals did not gain personally form their offenses and this defense has been
effective in the recent past; (2) The banks (victims of this crime) should have uncovered the
fraud and it may be that they turned their heads in which case fraud is not provable; (3) The
jury might say "to hell with the banks" and or "there but for the grace of God go I" reflecting
the notion that most jurors have overdrawn their accounts at some time; (4) It was likely that
one defendant might have successfully severed the case forcing the case to be tried twice; and
(5) The facts are very complex and few people understand the facts even after weeks of
briefings and news reports. Id. at 32.
110. Id. at 103.
Mr. Murray. The fact of the matter that they were going to be charged with a
felony, and if in fact they were charged with a felony, it might mean the revocation
of their license.
Senator Biden. Now, would not the charging of a felony and the application of RICO [the
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization Act] have made your case stronger?
Mr. Murray. Not really .... Hutton was afraid of being charged with a felony
because they were afraid of losing their license .... What they wanted was a civil
disposition and we took the attitude ... that in the event they did not want this plea
agreement, we were going to trial in a week. Id.
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The evaluation of these risks is not uncommon and defense counsel should
strive to understand the risks the government will face should they go to
trial.
According to Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen, the government
proceeds against an individual or corporation as a matter of law "when the
evidence establishes the existence of each element of the offense and the
necessary mental state to establish that a person has committed an
offense.""' The Department of Justice adheres to an additional standard of
going forward with prosecution only "when we believe that the admissible
evidence is of such convincing weight that it will persuade the reasonable
factfinder that we have met our burden of proof such that the defendant
will be convicted at trial."12
E. Defense Counsel Evaluates the Case:
A Strategic Task in the Pre-charge Stage
The question is whether to enter plea negotiations. Defense counsel
should wield his information and understanding of the government's case to
win early in the negotiation phase and avoid the embarrassment of
indictment with strategic pre-charge defense."' While this is the optimal
situation, it is not always achievable.
1. If Innocence of a Target Must be Maintained
Defense counsel should be aware that maintaining innocence could be
very costly. A recent example of maintenance of innocence is the battle
between the securities firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Drexel maintained
their innocence through two years of government investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and United States Attorney's office.114
On December 21, 1988, the Drexel Board of Directors agreed to United
States Attorney Rudolph Guiliani's demands."' The company agreed to
plead guilty to six felony counts involving mail, wire, and securities fraud
and pay a record $650 million in penalties. 116 The company estimated that
111. Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 31.
112. Id.
113. K. MANN, supra note 1, at 14.
114. Greenwald, Let's Make a Deal, TIME, January, 2, 1989 at 84.




Askinosie: Askinosie: Cool Hand Lawyers: White Collar Crime
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the investigation cost Drexel $1.5 billion in lost revenues and another $175
million in legal and advertising fees.
117
If the defense forgoes plea negotiations they elevate the possibility that
they can convince the government not to charge in a marginal case."5 If
the facts make this approach realistic, beware not to disclose prejudicial
facts to the prosecutor that will provide later ammunition in the event an
indictment is issued.19 Michael Mukasey, former government prosecutor,
suggests that the defense should narrow the prosecutor's focus on a few
relevant issues that are sure winners for the client.12'
If the defense attorney decides to make a presentation, it should be
made to the prosecutor not the grand jury.'21 A presentation is an
opportunity to convince the government not to charge or indict. A white
collar defense expert and former prosecutor says the legal advise is simple
if the client wants to testify before the grand jury: "The client should never
testify. Never under any circumstances." "  He continues, "The most
important decision is whether to allow the prosecutor to interview the target
at all. That is the legal equivalent of radical, experimental surgery. " "3 Only
do this if the interview may persuade the prosecutor to drop the indict-
ment. 124
Consider the possibility of going over the head of the line prosecutor
to his supervisors; the U.S. Attorney, or those responsible at the Depart-
ment of Justice.'25 Often, the organization of the Department is such that
most top positions are political appointments. Depending on the political
volatility of the charged offense, the more senior appointees may be more
sympathetic than a line prosecutor.l26
117. Id. at 85.
118. K. MANN, supra note 1, at 14.
119. Mukasey, supra note 55, at 242.
120. Id. at 244.
121. Connelly, supra note 52, at 20.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Cf. Kansas City Times, Nov. 18, 1988, at A-1 where after six hours of
interrogation a Kansas City Missouri grand jury cleared a former banker of conspiracy to make
a false statement and returned a no true bill. The banker was given an opportunity to present
his story to the grand jury and accepted. The United States Attorney Robert Ulrich noted the
rarity of a no true bill.
125. Connelly, supra note 52, at 20.
126. See generally J. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS (1987).
[Vol. 1989
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2. Pre-charge Substantive Defense
The pre-charge defense, if possible, should include substantive argument
(aside from procedural) to the government that will eventually lead the
government to realize they can not successfully prosecute the client.
Kenneth Mann, in his study Defending White Collar Crime, states that "[tihe
main concern of the substantive defense is to take a given set of facts and
derive factual and legal conclusions favorable to one's client."127 At this
phase, the defense attorney should attack the strongest legal theories of the
government.'28 The Guide To White Collar Crime argues:
Where there are two alternative theories of prosecution being
considered by the prosecution . . . it is ill-advised to attack the
weaker theory or even flag the issue, [instead attack the strongest
theory] in hope of avoiding its use . . . In like regard one should
focus only on the provisions which one knows the prosecutor is
actively considering. This is no time to "impress" the prosecutor by
suggesting statutory patterns he/she may not have uncovered .... 129
In a persuasive mode of presentation, defense counsel may appear to
blur the difference between legal and factual particulars. In reality, each
element is a distinct objective of the substantive defense.' The attorney
should draw on sources such as the Constitution, statutes, regulations, and
their judicial interpretations to form the substantive perimeter of proof that
a provable offense does not exist.' This phase of the defense, depending
on the case, could last for a year or more.3 2  The major reason for this,
and one of the significant differences between street and white collar crime,
is the length of investigation. 3
The pre-charge period presents sort of a precharge "adversarial review"
of the case against the client."' Mann continues, "[tjhe more attorneys
press the rights of their clients before administrative agencies, the more
I27. K. MANN, supra note 1, at 183. Mann observes that "During the period of
investigation of a potential criminal case, before a decision to charge is made, there may be
opportunities for a defense attorney to present substantive legal argument on the issue of the
culpability of his client." lId
128. M. Pico-OLTz, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 20, 21.
129. Id.
130. K. MANN, supra note 1, at 183.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 185.
133. Id. at 184.
134. Id. at 185.
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those agencies are forced to apply principles of due process."13 Some
defense attorneys submit written briefs of their legal argument and factual
analysis to prosecutors much as one would present to a court.' Attorneys
treat the prosecutors as if they are the judge in the case.13 7 Often the
substantive pre-charge brief is devoted to the ambiguities of offense
definitions in the statutes making up white collar crimes."3 The focus on
ambiguities may persuade the prosecutor that the facts of the case do not
apply to the law. Many of the attorneys in Mann's study cited as examples,
"tax fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United States and
bribery".' 39
Another factor in the precharge period is the decision not to enter plea
negotiations. This is critical because there are "countervailing reasons to
negotiate early."" The government will be more ready to grant concessions
before it completes its investigation. 1' The more the investigation advances
the stronger the case becomes. 42 Early in the investigation the government
may falsely assume that necessary evidence is inaccessible. 43 (The need to
negotiate early will be discussed in greater detail with regard to Coopera-
tion, Pleas, and Immunity.).
The decision of whether to negotiate a plea should be made upon
thorough evaluation of the case without waste of time. Mann comments
"[The defense attorney] is continually weighing the advantages in holding
out against the advantages in conducting early negotiations."1 As the
investigation continues to progress against a client the defense counsel may
likely refine his decision of whether to enter plea negotiations. 45 "As the
defense attorney receives new information about what the government is
likely to discover, he will have to reconsider [the decision to negotiate or
not] throughout the pre-charge period."146
135. Id.
136. Id. at 194.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 185.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 14.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 15.
143. Id. at 14.
144. Id. at 16.
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F. The Risks and Rewards of Negotiating Immunity,
Proffers, and Other Such Agreements
1. Negotiated Immunity and Other Agreements
In cases where there is potentially more than one defendant immunity
may be preferred. 47 The defense counsel should consider the ramifications
of immunity before the request. 1" The client may have had a low level
participation in the crime being investigated. t 9 The examination at trial and
media attention to statements made by an immunized client may be too
great a risk."'0 There is a high probability that the client's reputation in the
community will be impinged.'51 The client may be immunized but a
professional license may be revoked once the client's conduct is revealed.'52
One defense attorney declares, "The cloak of immunity will forever convince
many that [the immunized client] was as much a crook as was [the
defendant], but that his slick lawyer kept him out of jail."153
There are two kinds of immunity; transactional (immunity from
prosecution) and use (guarantee against the use of immunized testimony).5 4
Use immunity may be granted formally pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 or
informally by letter agreement.' Use immunity, says Michael Mukasey,
"assures that neither a witness's testimony nor the evidentiary fruits of such
testimony may be used against him.... " 6 The client must understand that
he is not protected from a perjury prosecution once granted any kind of
immunity.'57 If the client breaches the use immunity agreement by giving
false testimony, he can be prosecuted not only for perjury and contempt,
but also his truthful immunized testimony may be used against him in a
perjury prosecution.' 8 In the case of a transactional immunity agreement
breach, the client may find his immunized testimony used against him in a
147. Mukasey, supra note 55, at 244.






154. Mukasey, supra note 55, at 247.
155. Id. at 246. See generally, Principles of Federal Prosecution, USAM § 9-27.00.
156. MuKasey, supra note 55, at 246.
157. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 8.
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prosecution for the substantive crimes disclosed in the testimony.159 This
depends on the form of the agreement)'6
In United States v. E.F. Hutton, fifty seven people out of a possible 2,500
were granted non-prosecution agreements.' 6  The following exchange
between Senator Metzenbaum and Assistant U.S. Attorney Murray are
illustrative of a prosecutor's thought process:
Senator Metzenbaum. Under what circumstances was it necessary
that you grant them immunity?
Mr. Murray. Because they were attorneys and they exercised their
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. They would
not have testified, they would not have given us the evidence
regarding the actual transaction occurring. There was no alterna-
tive. There was either granting them letter immunity or not having
their testimony. 62
The government prosecutors are obligated to follow Department of
Justice polices concerning cooperation and immunity.1"3 A government
attorney, with supervisory approval, may enter into a non-prosecution
agreement in exchange for the person's cooperation when that cooperation
appears to be necessary to the public interest, and there is no other method
of gaining cooperation. 164 The United States Attorney's Manual (USAM)
159. Mukasey, supra note 55, at 247.
160. Id.
161. Hearings Part III, supra note 106, at 106.
162. Id. at 106. Senator Biden also questioned Mr. Murray about immunity.
Senator Biden. Why did you immunize Bacon before you got testimony?
Mr. Murray. We did not do that. We had proffers from Bacon. We knew what the
activity was--
Mr. Biden. Would you submit that for the record?
Mr. Murray. We did not have any written testimony. We knew--
Senator Biden. Did you have any oral testimony from him?
Mr. Murray. I believe we had a proffer from Peter Driscole, I believe who was his
attorney.
Senator Biden. It must be written down somewhere, right?
Mr. Murray. No
Senator Biden. In your records? You did not keep a record of that?
Mr. Murray. No; the way we do things is that we may get an oral proffer that we
do not keep a record of, and then what happens, when we formalize that in the
immunity agreement, we put all that in writing ....
Id
163. See Principles of Federal Prosecution, USAM §9-27.600 et seq.
164. Id. at §9-27.610.
[Vol. 1989
20
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1989, Iss.  [1989], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1989/iss/7
COOL HAND LAWYERS
further states that cooperation may be necessary to an investigation and
because of the person's involvement, they may refuse to cooperate based on
their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate themselves.'" The
prosecutor, according to USAM, has four approaches available to "render
the privilege inapplicable or to induce its waiver."1"
First, if time permits, the person may be charged, tried, and convicted
before cooperation is sought. Once convicted, the person will often no
longer have a valid privilege to refuse to testify, and will have strong
incentive to tell the truth to reduce the severity of his own sentence. 67
Second, the person may be willing to cooperate if the charges or potential
charges are reduced in number or degree." This will be discussed in detail
below. Third, use immunity: this method of securing the persons coopera-
tion is by court order to testify notwithstanding their invocation of the Fifth
Amendment.' 69 The final method of securing cooperation is by non-
prosecution agreement. 170  It should be recognized that the agreement
sometimes applies only to the jurisdiction of the particular U.S. Attorney
who made the agreement.71
2. Proffer Negotiations: The Ritualistic Dance
Between Defense Counsel and the Prosecutor.
A proffer is simply an offer of proof. An offer of proof, however, by
a client to the government can often be complicated. The "dance" is
described by Vincent J. Connelly and Tyrone C. Fahner, white collar defense
experts and former prosecutors."T' The lawyer requests assurance that his
client is only a witness.173 The prosecutor replies that no such commitment
is possible at the present stage of the investigation. 74 The lawyer requests
immunity for his client, whereupon he will cooperate fully and divulge his
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. This method is referred to as "flipping" and was extensively used in Watergate.
See Hearings Part III, supra note 105, at 103, 104.
168. USAM, supra note 163, at §9-27.610.
169. Id.
170. Id. See USAM § 9-27.610 to describe the conditions that must be met before such
an agreement is made.
171. Mukasey, supra note 55, at 248.
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knowledge about the activity in question.175 The prosecutor will then
suggest a written proffer (offer of proof) (some U.S. Attorney's offices only
accept oral proffers) by the defense so the government can attempt to verify
the client's information.176
Connelly and Fahner say the attorney and client face a dilemma; failure
to make a proffer risks others cooperating first making the clients "valuable"
information less valuable."77 On the other hand, the client's conduct may
not withstand careful scrutiny.17 Another possibility is that the co-
perpetrators may not cooperate in which case the government may not have
the information necessary to indict the client."79
Kenneth Mann maintains, "The art in making a proffer is to convince
the government of the value of the information without actually divulging
the information."80 Connelly and Fahner suggest creating a "Chinese wall"
around the proffered testimony.18' It is unlikely the prosecutor will agree
to an interview completely off the record unless the prosecutor is "inexperi-
enced, foolish or needy."182 Defense counsel should request that another
assistant prosecutor, one detached from the investigation, evaluate the
proffered information.' The argument is that the assistant in charge of the
investigation cannot evaluate the proffer of a witness in uncertain status
without its affecting the direction of the investigation.' 8  The detached
assistant can evaluate the proffer without revealing the contents to those in
charge of the investigation." The attorney get a written commitment that
if the proffered information is valuable the client will cooperate and receive
immunity or some other concession by the government.'8 Should the
proffered information reveal that the client's conduct is "too egregious to
ignore," the proffer is rejected.'87 The prosecutor will not have the benefit




178. Id. at 22.
179. K. MANN, supra note 1, at 16.
180. Id. at 139.
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If the prosecutors act honorably, the client cannot lose. At best, he will
receive a concession such as immunity.' 89 At worst, he retains the same
status prior to the proffer without the prosecutor benefiting from the
information."9
V. THE DEFENSE STRATEGY OF PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
Is DAMAGE CONTAINMENT
After plea negotiations, the prosecutor will know the defense attorney
thinks his client is guilty of at least something.19' Together, counsel and
client should discuss the minimally acceptable boundaries of the negotiated
plea."9 In Santobello v. New York,' 93 the Supreme Court recognized the
significant role plea bargaining plays in the administration of justice. In
1977 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that position in Blackledge v.
Allison," and stated "Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the
fact is that the guilty plea and often the concomitant plea bargain are
important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly
administered, they can benefit all concerned."195
A Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Agreements Under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and Federal Sentencing Guidelines
This Comment is not a discussion of "how to" apply the Guidelines.
However, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision upholding the
constitutionality of the Guidelines t" and their appearance of permanence,
a cursory discussion is appropriate. The Guidelines were promulgated by
the U.S. Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of
19 8 4 .197 The reform is a move to a more determinate form of sentencing.
Judge William W. Wilkens Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion and Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. K. MANN, supra note 1, at 14.
192. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 8.
193. 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
194. 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)
195. Id.
196. Mistretta v. U.S., 57 U.S.L.W. 4102 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1989).
197. 18 U.S.C. §3551 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
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Fourth Circuit, states that the process of Guideline application involves an
average of nine steps.'"
Judge Wilkens states that "[p]lea bargaining [under the guidelines]
remains an essential component of the criminal justice system."'" The
Commission did not suggest "radical changes" in the plea bargaining process
because of the possibility of "undermining the effective administration of the
system. . . . Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e), 21 [hereinafter Rule 11] the
prosecution and defense may agree to recommend a particular sentence to
the court or agree that a prison sentence will not exceed a certain duration.
Rule 11(e) also allows the prosecutor and defense to agree on a particular
charge the defendant will plead in return for other charges being dismissed
or not pursued. The three types of bargains as reflected in Rule 11(e)A,
B, and C are not mutually exclusive and can be used together in any
combination. Charge bargaining is more common than sentence bargaining
according to Judge Wilkens. 2 2 While the Guidelines Policy Statements
generally track Rule 11203 they also go further than "a reaffirmation of the
existing law and practices."2 4 For example, the policy statements suggest
that a judge, in accepting an agreement for the dismissal of charges or an
agreement not to pursue potential charges, should not accept the agreement
unless the court determines on record that the remaining charges "adequate-
ly reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and that [they]
198. Wilkens, supra note 30, at 185.
First, the judge determines the offense in Chapter Two [of the Guidelines] most
applicable to the statute of conviction . . . Next, the judge determines the base
offense level in addition to any appropriate specific offense characteristics listed under
the guideline. Third, if appropriate, the judge makes adjustments for special victim
circumstances, the defendant's role in the offense, and obstruction of justice. If there
are multiple counts of conviction, the preceding steps are repeated, the counts are
grouped and the offense level is accordingly adjusted. If appropriate, the judge makes
an adjustment for the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for his conduct,
resulting in a total adjusted offense level. Next, the judge determines the defendant's
criminal history category and any related adjustments under Chapter Four [of the
Guidelines]. The judge then uses the sentencing table to determine a guideline range
that corresponds to the total offense level and criminal history category. Except in
atypical cases, sentences should be within the guideline range.
Id
199. Wilkens, supra note 30, at 186.
200. Id. at 188.
201. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 embodies the rules of federal criminal plea procedure by which
the courts, government prosecutors, and defense counsel function.
202. Wilkens, supra note 30, at 186.
203. Id. at 189. See GUIDEINES at §§ 631.1-6B1.4.
204. Wilkens, supra note 30, at 189.
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will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing."m The court
may not accept a plea agreement that departs from the guideline sentencing
range unless it has justifiable reasons.' The Department of Justice,
Criminal Division promulgated the Prosecutors Handbook on Sentencing
Guidelines as direction for government prosecutors to observe.27  The
Department of Justice has attempted to advise their prosecutors how to
apply these Guidelines in the day to day operation of criminal law
enforcement. The Prosecutors Handbook lends insight as to the perceptions
of the Department and the manner in which they plan to apply the
Guidelines. The Prosecutors Handbook addresses the issues of sentence and
charge bargains.'
205. Id. See GUIDELINES at § 6B1.2.
206. Wilkens, supra note 30, at 189; GUIDELINES, § 6B1.2(b).
207. United States Dep't Of Justice Criminal Division, PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK ON
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1987).
208. Id. The PROSECUTORS' HANDBOOK states:
A significant problem with the Commission's policy statements on plea bargains
which include a specific sentence under Rule ll(e)(1)(B) and (C), § 6B1.2(b) and (c),
is that the standard they set forth for acceptance or rejection of a sentence that
departs from the guidelines appears to be of doubtful validity under the [Sentencing
Reform Act] ...
Nevertheless, the Criminal Division has concluded that the apparent authority for a
judge to depart from the guidelines pursuant to the Commission's policy statements, §
6B1. 2(b) and (c), for plea agreements involving a particular sentence under Rule 11(e)
(1) (B) and (C) is at variance with the more restrictive departure language of 18 US.C
§3553(b) and that, consequently, these policy statements should not be used as a basis
for recommending a sentence that departs from the guidelines. . . Although Congress
intended that courts exercise "meaningful" review of charge reduction plea agreements, it
is our view that moderately greater flexibility legally can and does attach to charge
bargains than to sentence bargains. While, as indicated previously, the Commission's
quite liberal policy statements on sentence bargaining appear to be inconsistent with
the controlling (and stricter) statutory departure standard, the statutory departure
standard is not applicable in the charge-bargain context. In the absence of an offense
"committed" by the defendant (e.g., where no charge is brought), there is no
applicable guideline sentence from which to depart. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(emphasis added).
Nevertheless, in order to fulfill the objectives of the
Sentencing Reform Act prosecutors should conduct charge bargaining in a manner
consistent with the direction in the applicable policy statement, § 6B1.2(a) ... In our
view, this translates into a requirement that readily provable serious charges should
not be bargained away. The sole legitimate ground for agreeing not to pursue a
charge that is relevant under the guidelines to assure that the sentence will reflect the
seriousness of the defendant's "offense behavior" is the existence of real doubt as to
the ultimate provability of the charge.
This discussion supports the conclusion that greater leeway should be accorded
the prosecutor in charge bargaining than in sentence bargaining However, in neither case
should the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act be undermined
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Guidelines or not, federal government prosecutors must use discretion
and adhere to certain principles when making the decision to negotiate a
plea with defense counsel.' Defense counsel should use the criteria set
forth by the Department of Justice and the Sentencing Commission to
negotiate the client's sentence exposure downward.
B. Tactical Strategies Defense Counsel May Employ
In This Phase Of Negotiation
The Sentencing Commission decided white collar offenders should be
incarcerated more regularly than in the past.2 0 Defense counsel should be
aware of this decision and attempt to downplay the client's role from the
outset of negotiations. As previously discussed, the goal at this stage is
damage containment. The applicable statutes have been researched prior
to this stage. The purpose at this phase is to "find a lesser offense whose
imposition would serve the purpose of a plea, yet whose punishment would
result in a less onerous term of imprisonment, or less serious punishment
than would be proposed by a prosecutor."21
This strategy must conform with the Guidelines in that the charge
finally pleaded must adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense
conduct.212 Furthermore, the lowered sentence exposure must be justifiable
under Rule 11. In other words, defense counsel should try to give the
prosecutor a lesser offense with less possible prison time that includes
offense conduct similar to that charged. An example would be avoiding a
Id. at 19-24 (emphasis added).
It is possible that the Department of Justice will rethink the above analysis as it interprets
Mistretta v. U.S., 57 U.S.L.W. 4102 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1989).
209. USAM at § 9-27.420 must be adhered to in making plea bargain determinations.
Considerations to be Weighed; § 9-27.420, are as follows:
The defendant's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others;
The defendant's history with respect to criminal activity; The nature and seriousness
of the offense or offenses charged; The defendant's remorse or contrition and his/her
willingness to assume responsibility for his/her conduct; The desirability of prompt
and certain disposition of the case; The likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial;
The probable sentence or other consequences if the defendant is convicted; The
public interest in having the case tried rather than disposed of by a guilty plea; The
expense of trial and appeal; and The need to avoid delay in the disposition of other
pending cases.
Id
210. Wilkens, supra note 30, at 188. See GUIDELINES at § 3B1.3 call for an increase of
2 levels if the defendant "abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in
a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense ..
211. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 41.
212. GUIDEUNES at § 6B1.2.
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plea to tax evasion which carries a five year sentence and or a fine of up to
$100,000.213 Instead, the prosecutor may agree to accept a guilty charge of
filing a false tax return which carries a three year sentence and or a fine of
$100,000.214 Another example would be instead of a guilty plea to making
a false statement to an agency of the United States under section 1001 of
title 18 United States Code, the client may be allowed to plead to a
misdemeanor count of making a false statement to the appropriate agency
under the agency's enabling statute.215
Another possible tactic is to persuade the prosecutor to accept
administrative sanctions by the appropriate federal agency. This is a remedy
that E.F. Hutton sought in 1986 and the government did not accept.116.
Depending on the amount of leverage a client is able to exert upon the
government, the client might be able to negotiate non-criminal sanctions or
no sanctions at all. The more leverage the defense brings to bear the better
the result for the client. A recent example, although not of the white collar
variety, was General Manuel Antonio Noriega's rejection of the "deal"
offered him by the U.S. government. The proposed "deal" was that Noriega
would resign from office and the U.S., in turn, would drop the indictment
against him. 217 Another example is former Vice-president Spiro T. Agnew,
who held out for the best possible deal before his resignation from office.218
Resignation is certainly a better alternative than prison. The National Law
Journal reports that this leverage is exhibited more often by banking
officials accused of currency reporting violations, insider trading, and other
securities violations.219
Depending on whether a corporation is involved, defense counsel may
attempt a "Westinghouse" plea if both corporation and individual officers
and/or employees are involved as targets. With this type of arrangement,
individual innocence is preserved. The "Westinghouse" plea is named after
a case in which Westinghouse Electric Corporation agreed to plead guilty
to felony charges and pay a fine, and in return the government agreed not
to prosecute the individuals who participated in the crime.' In 1986, the
Justice Department entered into a "Westinghouse" type plea in United States
213. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 41; 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
214. Id. 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
215. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 41.
216. Hearings Part III, supra note 106, at 108.
217. NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, June 13, 1988, at 3.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. J. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 36 (1987).
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v. E.F. Hutton.22' Recently, a "Westinghouse" type plea was denied in United
States v. Sunstrand Corp. which resulted in a $115 million criminal fine.'
The company agreed to the plea but certain company officials were still
under investigation which indicated the government's rejection of a
"Westinghouse" type plea.' In a "Westinghouse" situation the defense
strategy is to prevent the government from making a case against the
individuals, as in E.F. Hutton. However, the corporation cannot escape
criminal liability in this arrangement.
Defense may consider cooperation with the government at either the
pre-charge or post indictment stage (see above). Drexel Burnham Lambert,
as part of their plea agreement, must cooperate with the government in
their present investigation of Drexel junk bond mastermind Michael
Milken.?24  As previously discussed, there are circumstances where the
government will be willing to grant concessions in return for the coopera-
tion of the client. The prior discussion concerned the concession of
immunity. It is conceivable that the concession will be reduced charges or
reduction in the number of counts sought by the prosecutor. The Guide-
lines and Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 address the importance of
cooperation. Congressional intent is expressed in section 994 of title 28
United States Code and directs the sentencing commission as follows:
[aissure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of
imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed,
including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute
as a minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense.22
The court is not required to accept the plea agreement according to
Rule 11(e). Nonetheless, some experts suggest a method that will effectively
tie the court's hands. A grant of use immunity is built into the agreement
such that the government would immunize the defendant if the court
221. Hearings Part I11, supra note 106, at 35; United States v. The E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.,
E.F. Hutton Co., Inc., No. 85-0601 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 1985). While the plea agreement does
not say "this is a Westinghouse plea," the fact that the individuals were not pursued and the
corporation pled guilty indicates that type plea.
222. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
223. Id.
224. Greenwald, supra note 114, at 85.
225. Wilkens, supra note 30, at 196.
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rejected the agreed upon sentence under Rule 11(e)(1)(C). 227 However, a
question does arise as to whether this type of agreement will be feasible
under the Guidelines to the extent it undermines the purposes of sentence
reform.
Defense counsel should also consider the likelihood of a subsequent
state prosecution; often a violation of federal law is at the same time a
violation of state law. The defense should include as part of the bargaining
process assurances that "the federal prosecutor will act to obviate a
subsequent state prosecution, or arrange that a dual plea is entered in both
state and federal court in a global settlement on which punishment will be
concurrent."228 If the prosecution is first sought in the state court and a
federal penalty could attach, the Petite229 policy applies "as a self-imposed
policy of the Department of Justice, to forbid subsequent federal prosecu-
tion on the same substantive offense or offenses without special authority."
23°
Any plea agreement should give careful consideration to parallel civil
proceedings.231  A parallel proceeding is a "simultaneous adjudicative
[proceeding] that [arises] out of a single set of transactions and are directed
against the same defendant or defendants. "232 The Supreme Court permitted
parallel proceedings provided the particular agency and prosecutor are
"[plursuing independent inquires for legitimate purposes rather than to
circumvent the limitations on civil discovery."1 3 The Supreme Court has
held that if a civil defendant is compelled to testify, such testimony cannot
be used later to incriminate him without violating the Fifth Amendment.'
Several circuits have held that when "a civil plaintiff invokes the Fifth
Amendment privilege in response to discovery requests by the defendant, the
court should balance the competing interests of the parties. " ' Defense
counsel should be aware of this possibility and act accordingly.
227. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 42.
228. Id.
229. Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). See USAM § 9-2.142. The Department
of Justice policy is against duplicative federal/state prosecutions. Specifically, there should not
be a federal trial after a state trial for the same act or acts unless there are compelling reasons.
230. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 44 (citing, Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960)).
231. Glanzer, supra at note 63, at 44.
232. M. PIcK-HoLz, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 119.
233. Id. (citing, United States v. LaSatte National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978)).
234. M. PIcKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 119 (citing, Pillsbury Co. v.
Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983)).
235. M. PicKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 4, at 120 (citing, Wehling v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d
1243 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated with instructions to dismiss, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982).
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Defense counsel in a white collar case should consider the later civil
effect of a guilty plea. Seymore Glanzer, in Criminal Justice, cites authority
for the proposition that "a guilty plea has collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent litigation that involves a common material fact."23 This could
have a severe impact on an individual or corporate client. It is possible
that defense counsel, in the context of a global settlement, could negotiate
with other governmental agencies besides the prosecutor; perhaps the
Securities and Exchange Commission or Internal Revenue Service will settle
actions against the client in return for a criminal plea to prison and/or
fines.
Mr. Glanzer observes that disgorging large sums "is becoming counter-
productive." 7  The media coverage of such payments does not serve the
defense well since the media portrays to the public that the plea agreement
was purchased. The perception also prevails that "the greater the dollar
amount paid the more money the defendant actually stole."23s In an attempt
at such a strategy Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. reportedly offered $100
million to settle with the government; they were refused.239 In December
1988, however, Drexel reportedly agreed to plead guilty to criminal
wrongdoing and pay a record $650 million fine of which $350 million will
be set aside for Drexel's alleged victims.'l
Defense counsel should contemplate a waiver of indictment (of course
this assumes that one has yet to issue) and plead to an information carefully
drafted by the defense and prosecution. 4' This will give defense counsel an
opportunity to paint a picture without the "pejorative language that could
have prejudicial effect" states former prosecutor Glanzer. 22 The aim is a
reduction of charges in return for the waiver of the right to be indicted.
236. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 44 (citing, Gray v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243, 246 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984)).
237. Glanzer, supra note 63, at 41.
238. Id.
239. NATIONAL LAw JOURNAL, Oct. 17, 1988 at 21.
240. Greenwald, supra note 114, at 85.
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VI. THE POWER OF DISCRETION APPROACHED WITH THE SKILL
OF A NEGOTIATOR AND THE VIGOR OF AN ADVOCATE
Stanley S. Arkin, respected white collar defense expert, comments on
the E.F. Hutton plea bargain in the New York Law Journal. 3 One of
Arkin's conclusions is that defense counsel should be wary of calling the
prosecutor's bluff. His point is in response to a Wall Street Journal article
that states "[b]luffs, harried negotiations, and plain luck often determine the
outcome of complex white collar crime prosecutions."' Mr. Arkin asserts
that "[t]here are cases, and more than a few, where a government bluff may,
and in my view does, affect the outcome of serious prosecutions." 45 Arkin's
interpretation of the E.F. Hutton plea agreement is that it is the result of
a bluff by the government prosecutors.2" Arkin continues, "[p]ersonal
liberty may be at stake and in any event, what is at issue is usually apt to
be far more portent than mere money damages."247 Mr. Arkin surmises that
the reason for the behavior of government prosecutors is that they are in
the early stages of their careers "where ambition may affect judgments",
there is a desire for publicity among supervising prosecutors, and political
aspirations motivate.2 ' Arkin notes these aggressive qualities do have a
positive influence in that "bad people [are vigorously prosecuted] for bad
acts."249 However, he observes, if the prosecutors are bluffing there exists
a "danger of grave injustice.""0 Mr. Arkin offers no solution to the "risks
of calling the prosecutors bluff" because in reality "[w]e are left to rely
largely upon the decency of individual prosecutors and their chiefs.""'
Contrasted to Mr. Arkin's opinion is Wall Street Journal reporter James
B. Stewart's as expressed in his book The Prosecutors.25s Stewart declares:
In popular American literature, it is always the criminal defense
lawyer who is the hero. Who remembers the name of the
243. Arkin, Bluff--An Indefensible Stratagem by a Prosecutor, N.Y._.J., May 6, 1986. See
also, Hearings Part III, supra note 105, at 212, 213.
244. Id. (citing, Hutton Overdrafting Case Was Settled Only After Some Miscues On Both
Sides, Wall St. J., April 9, 1986).
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prosecutor in the Perry Mason television series? . . . it is the
prosecutor who wields the greater power, undergoes the greater
stress, is faced with more intractable dilemmas, and in the end is
the keeper of the flame of both justice and order5'
Stewart argues that the system of checks and balances affect prosecutors as
well. "There are limits to their power--judges, defense lawyers, the Bill of
Rights and the scrutiny of the press. Yet they exercise enormous discretion.
The decision to prosecute is one of the most solitary and unfettered
exercises of power in the American political system."24
An able white collar criminal defense attorney will hopefully be able to
detect a prosecutor's bluff and utilize one of numerous maneuvers to
successfully defend a client. Even though the odds are generally against an
acquittal, there is always trial.
M. SHAWN ASKINOSIE
253. Id. at 9.
254. Id. at 9-10.
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